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NALCC aptly illustrate the continuing trend toward relaxation of
reviewability standards. The explanation of the development lies pri-
marily, as suggested above, in the courts' attributing greater import-
ance to the plaintiffs condition than to the independence of adminis-
trative processes. This policy choice is typically implemented by
greater emphasis upon the judicial concept of ripeness, with its focus
upon the aggrieved party's condition, at the expense of the concept
of formality and finality as used in the APA. The danger lurking in
these developments is that dogmatic reliance upon ripeness as the
determinative touchstone of reviewability may result in undue disrup-
tions of the administrative process.
B. PARTIAL REPEAL OF THE DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINIS-
TRATIVE REMEDIES
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, described
by the Supreme Court as a "long settled rule,"' occupies a prominent
position in administrative law.2 Yet, in United States v. Consolidated
Mines & Smelting Co. , the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
by recognizing a heretofore ignored sentence of section 10(c) of the
Administrative Procedure Act, 4 has caused a significant diminution
in the scope of the doctrine's application. In four separate decisions'
the Bureau of Land Management, an agency within the Department
of Interior, had decided that several mining claims held by Consoli-
dated Mines & Smelting Co. (CMS) were null and void. After CMS
ceased to pursue its claims before the administrative tribunals, the
agency filed this action to quiet title to the land in question. The
district court originally granted the ag6n-cy summary judgment on the
1. Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50 (1938).
2. See generally 3 DAVIS § 20; JAFFE 424-58.
3. F.2d-. (9th Cir. 1971).
4. Except as otherwise expressly required by statute, agency action otherwise final is
final for the purposes of this section whether or not there has been presented or deter-
mined an application for a declaratory order, for any form of reconsideration, or, unless
the agency otherwise requires by rule and provides that the action meanwhile is inopera-
tive, for an appeal to superior agency authority. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1970).
5. ___F.2d at - Six agency decisions were at issue in this case. Because CMS had
exhausted the available administrative remedies in the first two decisions, the court simply made
a determination on the merits, sustaining the agency's position. See id. at - Only the
remaining four decisions are discussed in this note.
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ground that CMS had failed to exhaust available administrative rem-
edies;' however, on a motion for reconsideration, the district court
vacated the summary judgment and held that section 10(c) of the
APA made the decision judicially reviewable despite the exhaustion
doctrine. In a hearing on the merits, the district court sustained three
of the agency decisions but reversed the fourth on the ground that the
Bureau had improperly denied CMS an adjudicatory hearing. The
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed as to the first three
decisions, adopting the district court opinion; however, the lower
court's holding on the fourth decision was reversed, thus sustaining
the agency's position.
The enactment of the APA in 1946 expressed the desire of Con-
gress to simplify and standardize the unsettled state of federal admin-
istrative procedure. 7 A long established rule of that procedure was the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies-a doctrine devel-
oped by the judiciary early in this century9 as a matter of comity10 and
to insure the orderly and efficient administration of justice. 1 Since the
passage of the APA, the courts have continued to apply the doctrine
in light of its judicial genesis, without perceiving any congressional
intent to limit the doctrine.1 2 The third and final sentence of section
10(c) of the APA, however, expressly abrogates the doctrine in certain
6. Id. at - The opinion does not state the reason that CMS failed to exhaust its
remedies; nothing, however, indicates any excusable failure which may have justified review
without this novel construction of section 10(c). See Donato v. United States, 302 F.2d 468,
470 (9th Cir. 1962).
7. See Vanderbilt, Legislative Background of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act, in
FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 15 (G. War-
ren ed. 1947); S. Doc. No. 248 at 187.
8. See, e.g., McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193 (1969); Myers v. Bethlehem
Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938); Davis v. Nelson, 329 F.2d 840, 847 (9th Cir.
1964); Smith v. United States, 199 F.2d 377, 381 (1st Cir. 1952). See also 3 DAVIs § 20; JAFFE
424-50.
9. E.g., Comment, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies as a Prerequisite to Judicial
Review-Discretionary Treatment by Federal Courts, 44 MICH. L. REV. 1035, 1036 (1946). See
generally Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210 (1908); United States v. Sing Tuck,
194 U.S. 161 (1904).
10. See JAFFE 426; Comment, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies, 39 CORNELL L.Q.
273, 292-93 (1954); cf. Railroad and Warehouse Comm'n v. Duluth St. Ry. Co., 273 U.S. 625,
628 (1927); Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Kuykendall, 265 U.S. 196, 203 (1924);' Prentis v. Atlantic
Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 229 (1908).
11. United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 36-37 (1952); Prentis v.
Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 232 (1908); 37 U. CIN. L. REv. 856, 862-63 (1968).




circumstances. Unless otherwise required by statute, agency action
which is immediately operative 13 on the private party will be consid-
ered final for the purpose of judicial review. A private party can be
forced to exhaust his administrative remedies only if he is required to
do so by statute or if the agency rules both require him to exhaust
the agency appeals and make the original decision inoperative pend-
ing such appeals." Although this statutory language appears to signif-
icantly alter the exhaustion doctrine, government reports 5 and con-
temporary commentaries concerning the APA are replete with state-
ments that the provisions of section 10(c) "involve no departure from
the usual and well-understood rules of procedure in this field."'" The
legislative history,'8 however, makes it clear that Congress intended a
different import for section 10(c).19 Explanatory statements in the
13. The term operative is thought to refer to only that agency action which disturbs the
status quo; thus many unilateral agency decisions, such as denials of a claim or license, would
require exhaustion of administrative remedies. DAVIS § 20, at 105-06; DEPT. OF JUSTICE, AT-
TORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AcT 105 (1947).
14. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1970). See note 4 supra.
Neither the opinion, the statutory language, nor the legislative history deals directly with
the question of whether a court may deny review, despite the presence of an operative action, if
denial were clearly the more equitable choice. The failure of both the district and the circuit
courts to make any effort to weigh the equities indicates that section 10(c) was read as manda-
tory; furthermore, it can be argued that Congress, by the insertion of the clauses "[e]xcept as
otherwise expressly required by statute," id. (emphasis added), and "unless the agency otherwise
requires," id., has reserved to itself and the agencies the power to decide whether, in view of a
particular agency's area of authority, exhaustion should be mandatory.
15. S. Doc. No. 248, at 230 (statement by Attorney-General Tom C. Clark); id. at 369
(statement by Congressman F. Walters, Chairman, Subcommittee on Administrative Law,
Committee on the Judiciary, during House of Representatives proceedings prior to enactment
of the APA).
16. See Brown, The "Federal Administrative Procedure Act." 1947 Wis. L. REV. 66, 83;
Netterville, The Administrative Procedure Act: A Study in Interpretation, 20 GEo. WASH. L.
Rav. 1, 30 (1951); Reich, The Federal Administrative Procedure Act, 8 FED. B.J. 7, 20 (1946);
Comment, Judicial Review Under the A.P.A.-In Which Judicial Offspring Receive a Congres-
sional Confirmation, 23 NOTRE DAME LAW. 501, 524 (1948). But see Dickinson 577.
17. S. Doc. No. 248, at 369.
18. The legislative history of the APA is primarily comprised of the two committee reports
and the hearings held by the House Committee on the Judiciary in 1945. That material plus
the relevant portions of the proceedings of both chambers as reported in the Congressional
Record are gathered in Senate Document Number 248 of the second session of the Seventy-
Ninth Congress. See also Hearihgs Before a Subcommittee on the Judiciary on S. 674, S. 675,
and S. 918, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., pts. 1, 2, and 3 (1941); ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL,
supra note 13.
19. An amendment to S. 7 (APA), offered by the House Committee on the Judiciary and
retained in the final version, added the clause "and provides that the action meanwhile shall be
inoperative." S. Doc. No. 248, at 289. The footnote to the amendment clearly shows the
meaning attached by the committee to be the plain meaning of the added words. See id. at 289
n.2 1.
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congressional reports explicitly describe the desired operation of the
provision2 0 as well as the motivation for enactment: "There is a funda-
mental inconsistency in requiring a person to continue 'exhausting'
administrative processes after administrative action has become, and
while it remains, effective." '2'
Having determined that the intent of Congress was congruent with
the language used in section 10(c),22 the Ninth Circuit had merely to
determine which of the agency actions came within the meaning of the
statute. The first two adverse decisions, rendered after adjudicatory
hearings,2 were unsuccessfully appealed by CMS to the Director of
the Bureau of Land Management; however, CMS failed to appeal the
Director's decision to the Secretary of the Interior.Y Since the applic-
able agency statute did not require exhaustion, nor did the agency
rules either require appeal2 5 to the Secretary, or make the initial deci-
sion inoperative, 2 the court held that section 10(c) relieved CMS of
the obligation to exhaust its administrative remedies. The Ninth Cir-
cuit's major holding, then, found that these two agency decisions were
judicially reviewable.
The court's ruling on the third decision, however, limited its ear-
20. Id. at 213 (Senate report); id. at 277 (House report).
21. Id.
22. The court made no attempt to reconcile the apparent contradiction between the prefa-
tory comments noted, see note 17 supra, and the explanatory statements, see note 21 supra and
accompanying text. A possible explanation is that prior to the passage of the APA, the existing
agencies ordinarily lacked the authority to make binding determinations at a level below that
of the agency board or commission, so that section 10(c) would be expected to affect the
exhaustion doctrine in only a very limited number of instances. Section 8 of the APA, which
grants authority to subordinate hearing officers to make final decisions, was only briefly dis-
cussed in relation to this provision of section 10(c). See S. Doc. No. 248, at 289 n.21. Agency
regulations promulgated since 1946 reflect section 8's grant of authority, but do not always
attempt to avoid the operation of section 10(c) regarding appeals to superior.agency authority.
Compare, e.g., 43 C.F.R. §§ 221A0, .51 (1939) (General Land Office) and 46 C.F.R.
§ 201.17(a-b) (1939) (Maritime Commission) with 43 C.F.R. § 1852.3-8(b-c) (1970) (Bureau
of Land Management) (§ 10(c) applicable) and 46 C.F.R. § 502.223 (1970) (Maritime Admin-
istration) (§ 10(c) not applicable).
23. .___F.2d at - The hearings are known as "contest proceedings." See 43 C.F.R.
§ 221.67 (1962) (superseded).
The decisions under review were decided during the period of 1958-61, - F.2d at ;
consequently, citations to pertinent agency regulations will be to the next following codification,
43 C.F.R. (1962). The rules of practice found in the 1962 version were generally promulgated
in 1956, 21 Fed. Reg. 1860 et seq. (1956), and were in force throughout the period in question.
24. ___._F.2d at
25. See 43 C.F.R. § 221.31 (1962), 21 Fed. Reg. 1861-62 (1956).
26. See id. § 221.1,21 Fed. Reg. at 1860.
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lier application of section 10(c) by indicating its belief that the provi-
sion did not affect what it termed a "corollary" of the exhaustion
doctrine 2 -_issues not presented initially for agency determination are
deemed to have been waived, and will not be heard by a court review-
ing the administrative action.2 8 Because this third decision was made
unilaterally by the agency on the basis of documents on file, 2 with
no advance notice to CMS that there was any dispute, CMS did not
have an opportunity to raise the adjudicatory hearing issue at the
original proceeding. Even in its unsuccessful appeal to the Director
of the Bureau, CMS failed to raise the issue. The propriety of the
Bureau's action in not holding such hearings3" was raised sua sponte
by the district court.31 Both the district and circuit courts held that,
under the corollary to the exhaustion doctrine, CMS had thus waived
the right to have that issue judicially reviewed. CMS was entitled to
judicial review of other issues which had first been presented to the
agency, but it could not raise the "waived" issue, which might have
controlled the final result.
Although the fourth decision was also decided unilaterally by the
agency, with no advance notice to CMS, 32 due to the dissimilarity of
subsequent events the lower court felt it necessary to accord this
decision a different treatment and result. Unlike its response to the
third decision, CMS declined to take an administrative appeal from
27. See - F.2d at
28. See United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 37 (1952); Mulkern
v. Hammitt, 326 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1964); Adams v. Witmer, 271 F.2d 29, 36-37 (9th Cir.
1959). See 3 DAvis § 20.06, at 91-97; JAFFE 454-58.
29. -. _F.2d at -
30. The lower court felt that a factual issue was in dispute, therefore an adjudicatory hearing
might be required. Id. at
31. Id. at - Neither the district nor the circuit court opinions discussed the question of
the propriety of a court considering such an issue sua sponte. Cf. FPC v. Colorado Interstate
Gas Co., 348 U.S. 492 (1955).
32. CMS was not given advance notice of the agency action; however, the notice of decision
did state that the action would be inoperative for 30 days from receipt to allow CMS to take
an appeal to the Director of the Bureau. - F.2d at - In reversing the district court, the
court of appeals appeared to base its opinion solely on the failure of CMS to appeal to higher
agency authority although expressly noting that the decision was inoperative; yet, that court
made no direct connection between the inoperative nature of the action and its holding. See -
F.2d at - It would appear possible, if faced with a situation similar but for an operative
unilateral decision, that the court could easily distinguish its present holding in order to allow
immediate review based on section 10(c).
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the fourth decision." The district court found that, since CMS was
given no advance notice of the agency action, it was procedurally
unable to make a timely objection to the lack of adjudicatory hear-
ings. Under such circumstances, reasoned the district court, Waiver
could not be imputed to CMS, and failure to exhaust remedies would
thus not bar judicial review. 34 Reviewing the issue on the merits, the
lower court held that denial of adjudicatory hearings was improper
and a sufficient ground to overturn the agency's decision. The court
of appeals, however, was concerned that such a resolution of the third
and fourth decisions would create an anomaly-a party voluntarily
taking an intra-agency appeal but failing to raise a crucial issue would
lose his right to judicial review on that issue, while a party declining
to take the available appeal would retain his right to review of the
same issue. 3 The court of appeals therefore opted for a position favor-
ing the exhaustion doctrine and reversed the district court's ruling on
the last decision, holding that even if the party is denied the opportun-
ity to raise a particular issue because of the unilateral nature of the
original decision, any issues not considered in the unilateral proceed-
33. It is not altogether clear, however, that the agency decisions were operative-one of the
two conditions necessary to bring section 10(c) into operation. The agency rules effective during
the period of the agency decisions allowed the Director of the Bureau of Land Management to
designate individual cases in which the examiner would make only a recommended decision to
the Director, 43 C.F.R. § 221.76(c) (1962), 21 Fed. Reg. 7623 (1956); however, these proceed-
ings were not so designated. - F.2d at - See note 25 supra. The court apparently did
not consider 43 C.F.R. § 221.101 (1962), 21 Fed. Reg. 1865 (1956), which provided that
"[n]ormally a decision will not be effective during the time in which a person adversely affected
may file a notice of appeal, and the timely filing of a notice of appeal will suspend the effect of
the decision appealed from pending the decision on appeal .... " But for the ambiguity
supplied by the word "normally," this provision seemed to permit the application of the
exhaustion doctrine since it made the initial decision inoperative. However, the rules nowhere
provided that an appeal had to be taken. Cf. 43 C.F.R. §§ 221.1, 221.31 (1962), 21 Fed. Reg.
1860-61 (1956). While the opinion was unclear as to whether all four of the agency decisions
were immediately operative, one decision was noted as expressly stating that it would become
final within 30 days from its receipt unless an appeal was taken. - F.2d at - See note
32 supra. It should be noted that the language of section 10(c) is ambiguous as to whether an
action must be made inoperative by rule or at agency discretion. The legislative history is also
unhelpful; however, the "inoperative" clause was inserted as an addition to the pre-existing
phrase "unless the agency otherwise requires by rule." Whether the drafters intended to make
the additional precondition one effective only by rule is unclear. A rule would appear to be an
extremely inflexible mechanism when dealing with individual decisions; therefore, Congress may
well have intended to make this provision one to be applied at the agency's discretion. Cf. Note,
Direct Judicial Review of Administrative Action Under Section 10(c) of the Administrative
Procedure Act, 62 HARV. L. REv. 1216, 1220-22 (1949).
34. - F.2d at
35. See text following note 31 supra.
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ing must first be raised in an administrative appeal before judicial
review of those issues.
The circuit court's resolution of the fourth decision is inconsistent
with the purpose of section 10(c). First, in the circumstance of a
unilateral agency initial decision, the court's reasoning would repro-
duce the inequitable situation which Congress intended to remedy-a
party would be compelled to take an administrative appeal while
bearing the effect of an operative decision.36 Section 10(c) embddies
a legislative value judgment that imposition of an operative agency
action requires the immediate availability of judicial review. 37 Second,
the application of the "corollary" rule has been traditionally couched
in terms of an imputed "waiver"; it is patently unreasonable to im-
pute a waiver to a party who has failed to raise an issue solely for
reasons under the control of his adversary. In the instant case it was
because of the agency's failure to give notice of the pending decision
that CMS was prevented from seeking an adjudicative hearing .3 Fur-
thermore, to find a waiver in this fourth ruling misconstrues the pur-
pose underlying the "corollary" rule-fairness to the party-
opponent3 9 whether that party is a private party or the agency itself.4"
Conversely, if a party chooses to take an administrative appeal de-
spite a presently operative decision, as CMS did from the third deci-
sion, it is not unreasonable to shift the burden to that party to take
full advantage of the opportunity by raising all relevant issues.
In its major holding, the Consolidated Mines court has finally
brought judicial application of the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies
36. See S. Doc. No. 248, at 213 (Senate report); id. at 277 (House report).
37. Id.
38. See text accompanying note 32 supra.
39. It is considered unfair to allow a party to present an issue for the first time during
judicial review of an administrative action because the opposing party thereby loses the oppor-
tunity to argue and present evidence concerning the issue before the agency. Hormel v. Helver-
ing, 312 U.S. 552, 556 (1941); see JAFFE 455. See generally Blair v. Oesterlein Machine Co.,
275 U.S. 220,225 (1927); Board of Public Instruction v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068, 1072-73 (5th
Cir. 1969); Nuelsen v. Sorensen, 293 F.2d 454, 462 (9th Cir. 1961). A second important
consideration, although more properly related to administrative efficiency than fairness, is that
of allowing the agency to make the initial ruling upon the evidence and issue. See
Unemployment Comp. Comm'n v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 155 (1946); 3 DAVIS § 20.06, at 92;
cf. United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 37 (1952).
40. "Simple fairness to those who are engaged in the tasks of administration, and to
litigants" justified the rule requiring exhaustion. United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines,
Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 37 (1952).
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into conformity with the mandate of section 10(c). 41 However, by
refusing to hear the claim of denial of hearing in the fourth decision,
the court has left a small opening through which congressional in-
tent-that operative decisions afford immediate review-may be
thwarted. Section 10(c) does not, of course, present a serious impedi-
ment to the administrative process; the government conceded in
Consolidated Mines that it "could 'live with' the decision.142 This
interpretation of section 10(c) will have no effect on the many agencies
which already have either an enabling statute requiring exhaustion, 43
or rules of practice which make all initial decisions inoperative. 44
Either the operative statute or the rules of practice of the remaining
agencies upon whom section 10(c) is effective must be altered, 45 or the
agencies will face the prospect of judicial review at an early stage of
administrative proceedings. Regardless of the actual number of agen-
cies affected, the holding of Consolidated Mines can be viewed as a
progressive step in accomplishing the primary goal of the APA-the
simplification and standardization of federal administrative proce-
dure. 46 The rule requiring exhaustion, and the inequities which would
be produced by its inflexible application, have forced the courts to
develop a vast array of exceptions.47 The confusion generated by the
41. In two prior cases dealing with the Bureau of Land Management, the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit applied the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies to sustain agency action
under similar circumstances. Davis v. Nelson, 329 F.2d 840 (9th Cir. 1964); Mulkern v. Ham-
mitt, 326 F.2d 896 (9th Cir. 1964). The court decided that the holding in the present case would
not require an en bane hearing which is normally required to overrule an earlier case, because
section 10(c) was not considered in either the Davis or Mulkern opinion. - F.2d at
But cf. Samuel B. Franklin & Co. v. SEC, 290 F.2d 719 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 889
(1961); Consolidated Flower Shipments, Inc. v. CAB, 205 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1953) (in both
cases the court considered section 10(c) in regard to questions relating to applications for
rehearing and finality for purposes of judicial review, but did not consider the question of
administrative appeals).
42. - F.2d at
43. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 608c(15)(A)(1970) (Sec'y of Agric.); 15 U.S.C. § 717r(a) (1970)
(FPC); 15 U.S.C. § 8521(a, c) (1970) (FPC); 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a) (1970) (Bureau of Customs).
44. See, e.g., 14 C.F.R. § 302.27(c) (1971) (CAB); 49 C.F.R. § 1100.97(a) (1971) (ICC).
45. The least disruptive alternative would seem to be that found in the rules of several
agencies, whereby an initial decision is automatically stayed pending expiration of the period
allowed for appeal. See note 44 supra and accompanying text. A procedure of this type has been
imposed on the FTC by statute. 15 U.S.C. § 45(g)(1) (1970). The report of the House Judiciary
Committee on the APA lends support for a rule of this nature. S. Doc. No. 248, at 289 n.21.
46. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
47. See, e.g.. Levers v. Anderson, 326 U.S. 219 (1945) and United States v. Abilene & So.
Ry., 265 U.S. 274 (1924) (futility of exhaustion); CBS v. United States, 316 U.S. 407 (1942)
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application of these exceptions 8 has led a leading expert in the field
to say that "[t]he law embodied in the holdings clearly is that some-
times exhaustion is required and sometimes not."49 Widespread judi-
cial awareness of section 10(c) can simplify and standardize applica-
tion of the doctrine by limiting its use to situations where a statute
expressly demands exhaustion, or alternatively, where an agency both
requires exhaustion and makes its action inoperative pending appeal.
IX. JUDICIAL REVrEW-PRIMARY JURISDICTION
ANTITRUST VIOLATIONS AND THE COMMODITIES EXCHANGE
COMMISSION
In Silver v. New York Stock Exchange' the Supreme Court held
for the first time that the securities industry is not exempt from the
federal antitrust laws, 2 and promulgated the "necessary to make the
Act work ' 3 test to reconcile the Securities Exchange Act with the
Clayton and Sherman Acts. The Silver opinion, however, left unre-
solved4 the important and complex question of primary jurisdiction'
and Isbrandtsen Co. v'. United States, 211 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied sub nora. Federal
Maritime Bd. v. United States, 347 U.S. 990 (1954) (irreparable injury threatened); Skinner &
Eddy Corp. v. United States, 249 U.S. 557 (1919) (jurisdictional challenge allowed). See also 3
DAVIS § 20.01, at 56.
48. E.g., 3 DAvis § 20.02, at 60, 66-67.
49. Id. § 20.01, at 56.
1. 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
2. The Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1970), and the Sherman Act, id. §§ 1-7.
3. 373 U.S. at 357; see notes 28-30 infra and accompanying text.
4. The Silver Court stated:
Were there Commission jurisdiction and ensuing judicial review for scrutiny of a particu-
lar exchange ruling . . . a different case would arise concerning exemption from the
operation of laws designed to prevent anticompetitive activity, an issue we do not decide
today. 373 U.S. at 358 n.12.
Ordinarily the question of primary jurisdiction arises where a claim is brought before a court
and it is asserted that the court's jurisdiction to decide a pertinent issue has been superseded by
an agency's authority. JAFFE 121-22. Since the Supreme Court in Silver concluded that the SEC
had no power to consider the plaintiff's complaint, jurisdiction vested only in the court. The
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